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3  SOLVING COMPLEX PROBLEMS: APPLYING A 
  PROBLEM-ORIENTED APPROACH TO THE CASE 
  OF THE ORIENT/EAST-MED CORRIDOR 
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Literature
Abstract
The paper initially elucidates the so-called ‘problems-ﬁrst’ planning approach, where-
by planners are supposed to start any activity based on a precise deﬁnition of the 
problems that need to be solved. As a result, they become more relevant actors to 
both citizens and politicians, all of whom are considered important parties in solving 
complex problems. Following a brief introduction, the ‘key seven’, i. e. the seven key 
aspects of problem-oriented planning, are described. Brieﬂy, these are the various 
elements of a planning task that, when altered, have a disproportionate eﬀect on the 
range of possible solutions and thus thoroughly aﬀect the outcome of a planning situ-
ation. These include: (1) deﬁning the ‘socially constructed’ problems to be worked on, 
(2) modifying the (usually provisional) deﬁnition of the problem by shifting it back 
and forth, (3) testing the empirical adequacy of the assumed relationship at the base 
of how a problem is deﬁned, (4) elucidating the causes of a problem, (5) generating 
measures designed to solve the problem from these causes, (6) deﬁning key concepts 
(terms), as well as (7) incorporating various basic approaches to planning. The sec-
ond part of the paper illustrates the main problems observed along the Orient/East-
Med Corridor, including not only infrastructural bottlenecks, but also complex 
geo-political challenges. Accordingly, the conclusion summarizes the main recom-
mendations for the development of a strategy for the Orient/East-Med Corridor in-
cluding both the ‘planning world’ and ‘life world’ realms.
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Keywords
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Umgang mit komplexen Herausforderungen: Problemlösungsorientierter  
Ansatz am Beispiel des Orient/East-Med Corridors
Kurzfassung
Der Beitrag befasst sich mit dem sog. „problems-ﬁrst“-Planungsansatz, bei dem jeder 
Planungsschritt auf Grundlage detaillierter Deﬁnition und Kenntnis der zu lösenden 
Herausforderungen bzw. Probleme erfolgen soll. So werden auch Planungsakteure 
für Bürger bzw. Politiker sichtbarer und werden als wichtige Parteien bei der Lösung 
komplexer Probleme gesehen. Der Beitrag nennt nach einer kurzen Einführung die 
„key seven“, d. h. die sieben Schwerpunkte der problemorientierten Planung. Dies sind 
die unterschiedlichen Planungsaspekte, die sich bei Änderungen maßgeblich auf das 
Spektrum an Lösungsmöglichkeiten auswirken und damit das Ergebnis von Planung 
nachhaltig beeinﬂussen. Dies umfasst: (1) die Deﬁnition der zu behandelnden „sozial 
konstruierten“ Probleme, (2) eine der Situation eher angemessene Änderung der (in 
der Regel vorläuﬁgen) Problemdeﬁnition, (3) Prüfung der empirischen Validität der 
Grundlagen und Voraussetzungen des Problems, (4) Klärung der Ursachen des Prob-
lems, (5) vor diesem Hintergrund Erarbeitung von Maßnahmen zur Lösung des Prob-
lems, (6) Deﬁnition von Schlüsselstrategien (Begriﬀen) sowie (7) Einbeziehung ver-
schiedener Planungsansätze. Der zweite Teil des Beitrags verdeutlicht die wichtigsten 
Probleme entlang des Orient/East-Med Corridors; hierzu zählen nicht nur infrastruk-
turelle Engpässe, sondern auch komplexe geopolitische Herausforderungen. Hierauf 
aufbauend fassen die Schlussfolgerungen die wichtigsten Empfehlungen für die Ent-
wicklung einer Strategie für den Orient/East-Med Corridor zusammen, die die „Pla-
nungswelt“ und die „Lebenswelt“ umfassen.
Schlüsselwörter
Problemorientierte Planung – Eisenbahninfrastruktur – territorialer Zusammenhalt – 
Geopolitik – Orient/East-Med Corridor
1 ‘Problems First’ planning approach
Solving complex planning problems requires analyzing an initially opaque situation. 
More precisely, it is only possible to solve a complex problem once it has been clearly 
deﬁned. Somewhat diﬀerently put: it makes no sense to search for answers (or even 
to gather large amounts of data) before a question has been clearly formulated. 
Hence, the deﬁnition of problems should be placed at the front and center of planning. 
Such a procedure is designated ‘problems-ﬁrst’ planning (Schönwandt 2006, 2008; 
Schönwandt/Voermanek/Utz et al. 2013). 
Clearly delimiting the various steps that must be taken to solve a complex problem 
helps diﬀuse a criticism that often confronts spatial planners. Planners are frequently 
blamed for failing to suﬃciently address all of the problems that are relevant in a given 
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situation. Therefore, spatial planning is only capable of solving problems to a minimal 
degree. All too often, planning is thus simply deemed ineﬀective and considered irrel-
evant in politics (Krautzberger 1999: 23). Although this criticism is surely overblown, 
it does touch a nerve in much spatial planning: instead of focusing their attention on 
the problems that must be solved, planners often begin elsewhere. The following four 
ways of proceeding are especially typical (Schönwandt 2006: 26 ﬀ):
1 Planners often begin their work by choosing particular methods that are speciﬁc 
to their discipline or training. They often do this in advance, without checking if 
some other methods are better suited to the task at hand. For example, spatial 
planners often begin tackling a problem by taking the usual surveys of demo-
graphics, economy, traﬃc, etc. The problem is that in so doing they have severely 
restricted how the problem can be formulated. 
2 At the outset of a new task, planners often orient themselves by particular goals 
or mission statements. No doubt, these are essential tools in planning that cannot 
be done away with. However, if it is not clear what problems they are supposed to 
solve, a planning process runs the risk of becoming ineﬃcient. For example, some 
mission statements – such as ‘the city of short distances’ – are frequently called 
on without ﬁrst checking if they really ﬁt the problem at hand. Thus, planners who 
orient themselves by a set of predetermined goals often ﬁnd themselves in a situa-
tion where only a very limited and more or less random set of problems enters 
their line of sight. 
3 Planners often begin planning processes by immediately proposing measures or 
solutions common to their particular sub-discipline, without ﬁrst having suﬃcient-
ly probed the spectrum of potentially more well-suited alternatives. This is prob-
lematic because it automatically – often without the planner’s awareness – re-
stricts the planner’s domain of action to include only those problems that can be 
solved with those particular measures. For instance, measures in spatial planning 
are often restricted to designating sites for particular uses or constructing infra-
structure on those sites (such as buildings, streets, parks, etc.). What is too little 
appreciated by planners are measures that guide people’s actions and thus steer 
how they utilize particular sites; that is, measures that do not seek to change the 
physical world but rather people’s interaction with or use of a space and the infra-
structure it contains (Schönwandt 2002: 51 f; Jung 2008).
4 Planners often use particular theories to guide them through a new planning pro-
cess without ﬁrst ascertaining if those theories are well suited to the problem at 
hand. An example is Christaller’s (1933) and Lösch’s (1940) Central Place Theory, 
which in the past was often used to guide the allocation of infrastructure facilities 
in the development of a region. However, the theory, at least in its initial formula-
tion, is not well suited to planning problems that arise from the contraction rather 
than expansion of an area.
A fundamental feature of the ‘problems-ﬁrst’ approach is that it has very speciﬁc, 
targeted scope – it is especially applicable to long-term, high-level problems, which 
can be solved in the run-up to formal instruments rather than by preparation and de-
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velopment of formal mechanisms themselves. In addition, the ‘problems-ﬁrst’ ap-
proach is often time-consuming for situations in which proven and well-established 
procedures already exist. As such, it should be understood as an extension and not a 
replacement of traditional planning instruments. With this in mind, the basic outline 
of a systematic approach can now be drawn that centers on socially constructed prob-
lems to be solved by planning measures: a transdisciplinary approach according to the 
principle of ‘problems-ﬁrst’ planning (Hemberger/Schönwandt/Grunau et al. 2008a, 
2008b; Grunau 2008; Saifoulline/von der Weth/Schönwandt et al. 2009).
2 ‘Third generation’ planning model: principle components
Before elucidating the main aspects of the ‘problems-ﬁrst’ planning approach, it is 
worth outlining some basic features of the planning model that informs ‘problems-ﬁrst’ 
planning.1 A planning model of the ‘third generation’ is foundational to ‘problems-ﬁrst’ 
planning. Brieﬂy put, this planning model distinguishes itself from predecessors of the 
‘ﬁrst’ and ‘second generations’ in the following ways. 
Planning models of the ‘ﬁrst generation’ subdivide the planning process into a number 
of distinct phases: understand the problem, gather information, analyze this informa-
tion, develop solutions, evaluate those solutions, and, ﬁnally, execute them. This way 
of thinking assumes that: the formulation of a problem and its solution are distinct and 
independent; the approach is ‘objective’; there are unambiguous, comparable and 
non-contradictory goals; and, all of the information is accessible to the planner who 
can process it all (Schönwandt 2002: 30 ﬀ).
The ‘second generation’ planning models are characterized by the fact that neither 
the problem itself, nor admissible solutions, nor even the goals that are pursued can 
be deﬁned unequivocally and unambiguously. A consequence of recognizing the im-
portance of diverse cognitive viewpoints is that there is no single ‘objective’ or ‘cor-
rect’ way of seeing the world. Rather, there is a multiplicity of equally situated world-
views each of which represents its own form of local knowledge. Hence, it is essential 
to communicate and learn from one another. In so doing, we not only exchange ideas; 
eventually, we also develop solutions that build on and integrate the many, diverse 
views on any particular problem. 
The ‘third generation’ of planning models distinguishes itself from the ‘second gener-
ation’ in that it seeks to resolve two shortcomings of the latter (Schönwandt 2002, 
2008): 1) what is missing is an adequately nuanced, layered and multifaceted concept 
of planning that permits a suﬃciently clear and concise description to make it readily 
intelligible; and, 2) the ‘second generation’ models emphasize the importance of com-
1  Although their importance is sometimes underestimated, planning models are indispensable. This is 
because they are necessary to analyze, compare, test, communicate and improve a planning proce-
dure. Moreover, it is important to explicitly formulate our planning models. Those that are only intu-
itively grasped and unconsciously applied are inaccessible for analysis and cannot be further devel-
oped and improved.
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munication over all other concerns. For this reason, after the ‘communicative turn’ of 
the ‘second generation’, ‘third generation’ planning calls for a ‘turn to content’ (Schön-
wandt 2008: 46ﬀ; Schönwandt/Jung 2006: 364 ﬀ).
The planning model of the ‘third generation’ consists of the following three principle 
components (Schönwandt 2008; Hemberger 2014):
 > Concrete steps in planning. The model distinguishes between the following 
steps in developing a plan. First, a ‘comprehension of the situation’ must be estab-
lished, then ‘instructions’ (e. g. plans) are elaborated, next, ‘communication about 
behavior’ takes place, and, ﬁnally, concrete ‘interventions’ are put into place to ef-
fect ‘outcomes’ in particular spatial, social, political, environmental and economic 
‘settings’. The exact nature of the ‘outcomes’ that are actually brought about may, 
in turn, force us to revise our ‘comprehension of the situation’ and reinitiate the 
problem-solving process anew.2 
 > Life world. The life world is that section of the planning model that comprises the 
context or surroundings in which the planning process takes place. The life world 
includes all of the actors who are not in the planning world but who partake in or 
are aﬀected by a planning process (politicians, citizens, public authorities, ﬁrms, 
interest groups, etc.). The life world also includes the so-called agenda, i. e., those 
points of political discussion or conﬂict that serve as a catalyst for a planning pro-
cess or decision. Finally, it comprises all of the material realities (e. g. physical 
space) and conceptual conditions (e. g. social, economic, ecological, as well as po-
litico-administrative) involved in planning.
 > Planning world. Through their worldview, planners generate a planning world 
within a given life world. The planning world is the professional domain in which 
plans are worked out (via feedback with the actors of the life world). Essential to 
the planning world are what might be called the ‘basic approaches to planning’ 
(Bunge 1983, 1996). These are shared thought patterns or paradigms in the Kuh-
nian sense (Kuhn 1962/1981) that are brought into being by particular goals, ways 
of viewing a problem, methods and background knowledge (Schönwandt/Voigt 
2005). Every planner uses at least one approach that inﬂuences his/her communi-
cative as well as practical actions, whether consciously or not. However, since the 
choice of approaches in planning is not, as is commonly believed, dictated by the 
‘nature of things’, it is more or less open to us. In sum, approaches to planning 
have a decisive eﬀect on what will be planned and what solutions come out of a 
planning process.
2  It should be noted that besides having the overall character of a feedback loop, each step in the 
planning process may contain smaller feedback loops as well. Moreover, the described sequence of 
steps need not necessarily correspond to the actual order in which they are executed in a real-world 
scenario.
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3 ‘Key Seven’: components of problem-oriented planning
Without losing sight of everything planners must keep in mind when actually working 
on a concrete task, it is advisable to pay special attention to seven components in 
particular: the ‘key seven’. That is, we will primarily deal with those elements of the 
planning process that more than any others determine the range within which solu-
tions can be sought. Diﬀerently put, the key seven comprise those parameters of a 
planning task that, when altered, eﬀect the most profound change in the range of 
available solutions. Together, they exercise the most signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the out-
come of a planning process (Schönwandt 2008; Hemberger 2014).
3.1 Deﬁning the problem
According to the basic principle of ‘problems-ﬁrst’ planning, the beginning of a plan-
ning task consists of deﬁning the problem with as much precision as possible. A prob-
lem is here deﬁned as a state of aﬀairs that is considered undesirable in some regard 
– a grievance that either already exists or that will come into being in the foreseeable 
future. This stands in contrast to a targeted state of aﬀairs, or goal, into which we 
hope to transform the problem. Also, the term ‘problem’ is associated with the fact 
that the measures capable of transforming the undesirable state of aﬀairs in the 
wished-for goal are so far unknown. If these measures are already known we are not 
dealing with a ‘problem’ per se, but rather with a routine task.
Deﬁning a problem may well sound like an easy task. However, experience shows that 
professional planners often ﬁnd it hard to abandon well-worn methods, goals, theories 
and standardized solutions, even though this is precisely what is required to give a 
precise deﬁnition of a problem. Moreover, it is essential that planners develop 
well-founded deﬁnitions of their problems because a failure to do so makes it impossi-
ble to formulate a rigorous chain of reasoning from the problem to its solution. If 
nothing else, this is true because a problem that goes unnamed cannot really be under-
stood.
When engaged in determining what the problem at hand consists of, it is helpful to 
remind oneself that problems do not exist per se. Rather, there are certain states of 
aﬀairs or occurrences we as human beings have subjectively deemed to be problem-
atic. Problems are thus always ‘socially constructed’, the product of a negotiation be-
tween diverse people or groups of people (Koppenjan/Klijn 2004: 116 ﬀ). 
The challenges when deﬁning a problem as the ﬁrst step in planning are brought into 
especially stark relief by the following considerations (Koppenjan/Klijn 2004: 116 ﬀ):
 > Problems are neither ‘self-evident’ nor can they be ‘objectively’ identiﬁed. Rather 
they depend on the perception of human actors and are thus always ‘socially con-
structed’.
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 > Diﬀerent actors can perceive the same problem in extremely diﬀerent ways. Un-
certainties about the content of a problem are therefore not only caused by the 
factual complexity of the problem, but also the divergent perceptions and value 
judgments of the actors involved.
 > When actors draw conclusions based on widely divergent perceptions of a prob-
lem and at the same time are unwilling or unable to reﬂect on these diﬀerences in 
their perceptions, it becomes increasingly likely that communication or interac-
tion between them will degenerate into a so-called ‘dialogue of the deaf’.
 > Given the plurality of perceptions and preferences that can be expected to pertain 
among diﬀerent actors, they must avoid cognitive rigidity in coming to a common 
understanding or representation of the problem at hand.
 > In order to achieve a common understanding of a problem, it is especially helpful 
to recognize and reﬂect on each actor’s basic approach to planning.
Given the subjectivity or situated nature of how we understand them, we must recog-
nize that all the people who participate in a planning discussion must ﬁrst come to an 
agreement on how to deﬁne the problem at hand. In so doing, they must take into 
account who is negatively aﬀected by the given state of aﬀairs and in what ways. In 
addition to these negative eﬀects, it is also important to explicitly describe the posi-
tive features of such a state of aﬀairs lest they be inadvertently ‘wiped from the table’ 
in the course of implementing a solution. It follows that planners cannot serve as a 
neutral broker or mediator in the planning process because the requisite, value-free 
point of view does not exist. 
3.2 Shifting the problem
As a rule, deﬁning a problem restricts the range of possibilities within which solutions 
can be sought. However, ‘shifting’ the problem helps ascertain if the initial deﬁnition 
ought to be modiﬁed in order to make a new range of possible solutions available for 
consideration. It is especially important not to commit oneself to an overly narrow and 
limited subset of possible solutions when deﬁning a problem at the outset of the plan-
ning process. 
Problems can be also deﬁned as negatively evaluated states of aﬀairs that are caused 
by particular circumstances and which bring about new circumstances and states of 
aﬀairs. Shifting the problem consists of using questions such as ‘where does the prob-
lem originate’ (shifting back) and ‘where does the problem lead’ (shifting forward) to 
move the problem back and forth along causal chains of reasoning. Although ques-
tions such as the foregoing – as well as the more general ‘is the problem not in fact …?’ 
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– allow us to shift the ‘location’ of a problem, it is important not to lose sight of how 
we originally understood the problem. Rather, the object is to discover more suitable 
starting points for its solution.3
3.3 Checking the assumed relationships fundamental to the problem   
 deﬁnition
A set of assumed relationships (alleged matters of fact) always underlies the deﬁni-
tion of a problem. For this reason, it is important to check if there is suﬃcient empiri-
cal evidence that such relationships really exist. Not infrequently, it is found that a 
given set of assumed relationships does not adequately represent a real state of aﬀairs 
and the deﬁnition of a problem must therefore be reworked from the ground up. 
This step in the problem-solving process sometimes requires invoking one’s entire 
repertoire of analytic tools – both quantitative and qualitative, e. g. questioning, ob-
servation, statistical analysis, etc. (Lamnek 1995). It is thus important not just to go 
about gathering data blindly, without reference to a clear deﬁnition of the problem at 
hand. Moreover, a thorough clariﬁcation of what the available data/indicators cannot 
accomplish is often missing, as well. Finally, either due to lack of money or adequate 
time, we are often forced to estimate relationships in only a cursory manner. 
3.4 Causes of the problem
Measures that provide a permanent solution rather than just attacking a symptom of 
the problem are best devised once it is known what brought about or maintains the 
negatively evaluated state of aﬀairs in the ﬁrst place (Bunge 1987). As a rule, complex 
problems are brought about by a multiplicity of causes. As such, the planning process 
requires researching these causes to such an extent that a coherent picture of the re-
lationships between them can be drawn. The more causes are identiﬁed, the more 
starting points present themselves to the planner and the more wide-ranging the 
space of possible solutions becomes. In so doing, it is important to elucidate not only 
the breadth of causes but also their depth. That said, the following challenge is inher-
ent to this step in the planning process: every cause can in principle be elucidated in an 
increasingly detailed and ﬁne-grained manner by tracing it back to earlier events 
which, in turn, are themselves brought about by yet more distant events, ad inﬁnitum.4 
3  A simple example can help here. The following deﬁnition of a problem: ‘city x has too few parking 
spaces’ immediately leads to the conclusion that additional parking spaces are needed. However, 
saying that ‘too many commuters drive from the suburbs into city x to go shopping’ calls for new 
solutions. A central principle of shifting problems backwards in this way is to ‘get down to the roots 
of the trouble’.
4  Let’s have a look at the problem of urban sprawl: it appears due to new constructions taking place at 
the periphery rather than in the city center; this is because properties are more expensive the clos-
er they are located to the center; these diﬀerences are dictated by a high demand for living space 
near the city-center, which, ﬁnally, is due to the rise in the number of households. 
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A consequence of ‘following’ causal chains further and further back to their origin is 
that eventually we reach a point where nearly all states of aﬀairs and events can – at 
least in theory – simply be chalked up to basic natural regularities. The danger in this 
is that we may lose sight of details in a causal chain’s complex reticulating structure. In 
the ﬁnal analysis, it is not clear at what point the task of detailing ever more ﬁne-
grained causal chains becomes purely ‘academic’. Nevertheless, as a rule of thumb it 
is advisable to continue following causal chains so long as eﬀective measures and solu-
tions can be derived from each additional cause. At this stage in the planning process, 
we must therefore be content to make do with heuristic simpliﬁcations in remedying 
a problem rather than making the mistake of thinking that we are able to ﬁnd the ‘true’ 
causes of a problem or achieve a ‘conclusive’ analysis.
3.5 Measures for solving the problem
A further stage in the planning process involves devising measures that: 1) remove the 
causes of a problem (or at least lessen their impact), and 2) by which an unwanted 
state of aﬀairs is transformed into something desired. The more precisely the mea-
sures target the causes of a problem, the more eﬀectively they will solve that prob-
lem.5 Since as a rule, complex problems and their causes cannot be eliminated by just 
one or even a few measures alone, a variety of diﬀerent measures that work in con-
junction with one another should be devised. It is especially important to develop 
suﬃciently diverse measures in large numbers because doing so helps counteract an 
inherent tendency towards mono-causal thinking (Einhorn/Hogarth 1982; Schön-
wandt 1986). Finally, employing several measures in combination with one another is 
useful in dealing with complex problems because it helps planners exploit a broader 
range of possible solutions. In practice, it is important to have access to a broad range 
of potential measures because this allows one to fall back on alternative plans of ac-
tion should a given measure prove impossible to implement.
That said, it is of course especially important to ensure that the given measures are 
actually well suited to bringing about the sought-after goal. Planners must therefore 
predict and evaluate the eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency and feasibility of any proposed mea-
sures (including a targeted analysis of unwanted side-eﬀects). Given the range of 
available options, it is only on the basis of such a thorough evaluation that all the suit-
able measures can be identiﬁed and combined into a kind of ‘bundle’. 
5  For example, if we assume that too many people search adequate living space as there is no suﬃ-
cient housing stock in a city, the possible measure could be building additional residences. However, 
if the problem lies in an inability to allocate existing living space to those in search of housing, then 
the called-for solution is to bring producers and consumers together (see Bunge 1999 or Schön-
wandt 2002: 86ﬀ, 148 ﬀ).
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The following four measures at the disposal of spatial planners ought to be taken into 
consideration (Heidemann 1992; Jung 2008):
 > Allocating sites (e. g. residential or commercial areas, free and green spaces);
 > Constructing facilities (e. g. homes, squares, streets, parks);
 > Steering the organizations (e. g. associations, public institutions, business ven-
tures, etc.) that make use of those facilities; and
 > Inﬂuencing the behavior of people that make use of these sites and facilities.6
Not infrequently, spatial planners concentrate their attention on the ﬁrst type of mea-
sure: they make use of regional, area-use, and construction plans to allocate space; 
that is to say, they ascribe certain uses to a given space. Planners do so by way of the 
‘usual’ instruments of spatial planning: central places, axes, high-priority and designat-
ed spaces, green corridors, and master plans. The construction of facilities (type-2 
measures) is usually given over to architects. Steering the use of facilities (type-3 
measures) and inﬂuencing behavior (type-4 measures), on the other hand, are often 
neglected by spatial planners.
Nonetheless, type-3 and type-4 measures can have a signiﬁcant eﬀect on how a space 
is used: decisions about the allocation of sites, traﬃc, infrastructure, the environ-
ment, etc., are usually cashed out in the behavior of organizations and people. More-
over, type-3 and type-4 measures broaden the range of actors (stakeholders) to 
whom plans are addressed.7 In sum, instruments of spatial planning are most eﬀective 
if they operate at all four levels described above and do not create any interference 
between them.
6  The ‘logic’ behind distinguishing between the four kinds of measures is as follows: a site never exists 
per se, rather, it always serves as a location for some facility. Facilities (construction projects, 
parks, nature preserves, etc.) are never built or operated without having some kind of a use. Thus, 
they serve to accommodate organizations, which, in turn, always consist of people whose behavior 
have an eﬀect on space.
7  A prominent example of a type-3 measure – steering organizations – is the so-called integrated syn-
chronized timetable. The innovation of this concept was to change how train systems operate by in-
tegrating or coupling the schedules of various lines. Very little had to be done to the physical fea-
tures of the train lines but the measure nonetheless had an enormous impact on how people use 
public transit.
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3.6 Key concepts
Planners always work only with more or less accurate descriptions of the world. These 
descriptions consist of concepts (terms) that are tied into propositions via relations.8 
Concepts are neither ‘true’ nor ‘false’. Their deﬁnition is the result of a negotiation and 
they are informed by the background knowledge of those who use them. Moreover, 
only their core can be deﬁned; their edges cannot be outlined with precision (Bunge 
1996: 49 ﬀ; Schönwandt 2002: 81; Adis/Schönwandt 2005).
Even concepts that are central to planning, such as mixed-use facilities, traﬃc or sus-
tainability, are often used in totally diﬀerent ways by diﬀerent people. This can result 
in contradictory procedures and proposed solutions, depending on the deﬁnition of 
each concept in the relevant context (Schönwandt 2002: 139). As a result, the key 
concepts in planning must be deﬁned (read: semiotically interpreted) with precision 
and care. This is true for the following two reasons: 1) this enables diﬀerent actors to 
understand the content of a plan as well as its implementation more easily, and 2) how 
we deﬁne our concepts determines our actions and therefore the measures we will 
propose.
It is especially important to recognize that the deﬁnitions of concepts determine our 
actions in that they facilitate (or inhibit) our ability to see all the potential solutions to 
a problem.9 A change in the deﬁnition of a concept not only makes new types of solu-
tions available for inspection but also makes it possible simply to deﬁne a problem 
away. For example, the European Union decided some years ago to set extremely 
stringent guidelines to regulate acceptable levels of pollution in potable water. Howev-
er, extensive use of fertilizers and pesticides places a heavy burden on potable water 
in many parts of Europe. To solve this problem, the law has simply been updated to 
raise the levels of acceptable pollution. Hence, the concept of ‘potable water’ has 
simply been redeﬁned: actual pollution levels are not reduced, but they are made legal 
(for this and other examples, see Schönwandt 2002: 82 f). This illustrates that con-
cepts not only determine our actions and have the potential to help us reach a mutu-
ally satisfactory agreement. They can also be used as an instrument of power and 
manipulation through which planning can be steered in a particular direction.
8  For example, the sentence ‘densely constructed cities with mixed-use facilities make for shorter dis-
tances and thus elicit less traﬃc’ relates to the concepts of: density, city, mixed-use facilities and 
traﬃc and binds them into a proposition. 
9  For example, trying to solve a problem in the distribution of high schools by interpreting ‘high 
school’ as a physical place in which teaching and learning takes place hinders recognizing that broad-
ening this deﬁnition raises the possibility of designing educational facilities for time- and space-in-
dependent teaching and learning (e. g. by using new information and communications-technolo-
gies).
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3.7 Basic approaches to planning
‘Basic approaches to planning’ are foundational, paradigmatic thought patterns that 
act like spectacles to determine how planners see the world (Kuhn 1962/1981; Bunge 
1996). Approaches to planning here also include what the literature in planning theory 
describes as the ‘logic of action’. Among other things, approaches to planning include 
particular ways of seeing a problem, goals, methods, as well as our background knowl-
edge. All four depend on one another and are usually found in conjunction. The choice 
of approaches to planning is not, as has been previously mentioned, in the ‘nature of 
things’. Rather, planners are free to choose and switch between various approaches as 
they see ﬁt (Schönwandt/Voigt 2005). When working out an actual plan it is thus nec-
essary to sound out and subsequently make use of the whole range of actions coupled 
to various diﬀerent approaches to planning.
Every planner makes use of at least one basic approach that inﬂuences his/her thinking 
as well as communicative and practical actions, either consciously or not. The choice 
of basic approaches is determined especially by the professional community which a 
planner belongs to – by the body of thought that has been conferred upon a planner 
by membership in a particular knowledge and belief society. Since every approach to 
planning only allows for a limited number of ways in which problems can be deﬁned, 
goals determined and problems solved, each unintentionally leads to a kind of ‘tunnel 
vision’ (Schönwandt/Voigt 2005): as a rule, urban planners come up with planning 
solutions, sociologists with sociological ones, business administrators with economic 
ones, etc. As such, the members of a discipline tend to overlook the fact that the view-
points and methods of other disciplines oﬀer new and helpful perspectives or ap-
proaches.
The range of approaches to planning also varies greatly between the various profes-
sional disciplines: for example, in addition to urban planning, which is primarily en-
gaged in the allocation of sites, there is also urban design, urban planning as social 
planning, etc. Every approach to planning thus entails a diﬀerent way of doing things 
that is more or less suited to a particular problem (Schönwandt/Voigt 2005). More-
over, the diﬀerent approaches to planning also mirror diﬀerent philosophical (in par-
ticular ethical) positions, e. g.: the various ways of understanding the relationship be-
tween the state and the economy which in turn correspond to diﬀerent conceptions 
of justice and thus eventually determines which social groups – the strong, who ‘keep 
society moving’ or the ‘weak’, the ‘majority’, etc. – a planner supports (Davy 1997: 
267). A change in basic approaches thus almost always entails a change in our under-
standing of a plan and, as such, the measures that we will propose.
For all the foregoing reasons, it is of vital importance to draw on a variety of approach-
es to planning. Doing so allows us to take advantage of the diﬀerent range of solutions 
that each one entails. Moreover, this makes it easier to understand, moderate and in-
tegrate the various viewpoints of diﬀerent stakeholders in the planning process.
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4 The Orient/East-Med Corridor: a test-bed for a problem-oriented   
 approach
Improving the transport infrastructure routes, which include railway lines, usually 
plays an important role for the economic development of a region in Europe and else-
where in the world. Nevertheless, expanding traﬃc infrastructures does not automat-
ically lead to positive economic development. This becomes clear when observed 
from a broader (i. e. regional and/or national perspective). Namely, certain regions 
which host new infrastructural (mainly transnational) axes become more competi-
tive, but others may become peripheral. However, one thing is sure: traﬃc infrastruc-
ture that is limited in its function or missing altogether can complicate or even block 
development. This means that functioning infrastructure is not a suﬃcient, but cer-
tainly a necessary condition for the positive economic development of a region.
On the other hand, infrastructural improvements not only speak for the economic 
harmonization of a region – strengthening infrastructural connections aﬀects politi-
cal and geo-strategic aspects, as well. More precisely, infrastructural development 
contributes to territorial cohesion within a region or nation state, or between the 
states or even continents. In the past, after each major war Europe started with its 
redevelopment by investing in its infrastructure. Numerous policies of the recent past 
certainly followed this trend of understanding infrastructure as a tool for spatial and 
any other development. The future of European infrastructural development cannot 
neglect global, intercontinental inﬂuences.
With this complexity in mind, the working party gathered around the project “Spatial 
and Transport Development in European Corridors: Example Corridor 22, Hamburg–
Athens” decided to equally consider two branches of the Orient/East-Med (OEM) 
Corridor: one running through the European Union (EU) states of Romania and Bul-
garia, and the other through the Western Balkan countries. The reasons for such an 
approach are twofold: 
 > The necessary infrastructural improvements in the EU states of the OEM Corridor 
involve construction work in a topographically inconvenient area. As a result, a 
number of tunnels and bridges would be necessary to make the OEM Corridor ful-
ly operable in these countries. In contrast to this, the 400-km route through Ser-
bia and the Republic of Northern Macedonia connects Budapest to Thessaloniki 
through river valleys, making this branch highly competitive in terms of infrastruc-
tural upgrade and the associated costs in comparison with the EU route.
 > By its very deﬁnition transnational corridor development implies the involvement 
of various administrative levels and, more importantly, their cooperation. Also, 
any major development in Europe cannot be observed only ‘from inside’; rather, it 
is aﬀected by global conditions. Therefore, the current developments in the West-
ern Balkan region as well their geo-strategic signiﬁcance (not only for the region, 
but also for Europe) must be taken into consideration. 
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Following this twofold logic of analysis, the next section describes the current prob-
lems along the OEM Corridor, both through the lens of infrastructural development, 
i. e. based on EU and non-EU interventions in physical improvements, as well as from 
the view of political and geo-strategic importance, i. e. taking into account the contex-
tual prerequisites for certain planning interventions. 
4.1 The Orient/East-Med Corridor: a ‘planning world’ perspective
Some of the problems observed along the OEM Corridor are related to infrastructur-
al improvements and the operation of railway services. Some general remarks on the 
reasons behind infrastructural upgrades are given ﬁrst, followed by the concrete mea-
sures undertaken by various parties involved in the development of the OEM Corridor.
A generic challenge of investing in railway services is the following: under what princi-
ples should a railway company operate? Should it strictly follow the rules of market 
economies? Or should other criteria, i. e. ecological criteria, such as ‘shifting freight 
transport from road to rail’ or social criteria, such as ‘oﬀering mobility possibilities to 
people living in the countryside, despite the required rail service not being able to 
operate economically’, also be considered? At its core, the question is ‘how much 
state’ and ‘how much market’ is wanted in railway operation. The problem is that when 
railway operations are left to corporations from the private economy, then they fol-
low economic guidelines prioritizing economic eﬃciency. Other topics, such as public 
economic issues (a general mandate to develop the infrastructure) or social and eco-
logical issues are of secondary importance to them and are therefore not usually pur-
sued with the necessary commitment. This means that leaving the issue of transport 
infrastructure to the private sector alone promises little success. It is noteworthy – 
because, in the OEM Corridor context, it is counterproductive – that the privatization 
of the port in Piraeus has been called for by the EU, for example, through the privat-
ization conditions imposed on Greece in return for the loans from the euro safety net.
The previous ﬁnancial incentives led to the creation of a number of concrete instru-
ments for infrastructural development along the Core Network Corridors (CNC), 
therefore also for the OEM Corridor. From the strategic point of view, CNC are seen 
as an instrument for the coordinated implementation of the core network as they 
cover the most important long-distance transport ﬂows (Regulation (EU) 1315/2013). 
When it comes to implementation, the main instrument at the EU level to support 
transport development and the implementation of the core network for the funding 
period 2014–2020 is the ‘Connecting Europe Facility’ (CEF) (Regulation (EU) 
1316/2013). This EU instrument deﬁnes the scope of the corridor and pre-identiﬁed 
projects. Several TEN-T/CEF calls have been published for EU co-funding of 1) 
pre-identiﬁed projects, 2) other projects on the CNCs, and 3) the complementary 
networks, inviting Member States, railway infrastructure companies, railway opera-
tors etc. to apply for co-funding. Finally, the ‘cohesion envelope’ ensures that a signif-
icant share of the CEF budget is spent in central and eastern EU countries.
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In the meantime, it has become clear that China has enormous plans regarding infra-
structure along the New Silk Road.10 According to the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the 
total costs of this project, also known as ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, will amount up to 1.1 
trillion dollars (FAZ 2017b). Xi also responded to the allegations that China is following 
a nationalist strategy, which aims at creating new distribution channels for its state 
economy suﬀering under excess capacities, especially towards or in Europe and there-
by expanding Beijing’s political inﬂuence throughout the world. However, the aim is 
clear – cooperation and a win for all sides (FAZ 2017b).
The current EU position towards this project can be read in the closing statement of 
this conference. The EU states initially did not want to support the joint closing state-
ment of the conference because the prescribed standards for the planned infrastruc-
ture projects did not go far enough (FAZ 2017b). The focus of the EU is also insightful: 
it is on boundary conditions for the construction of structures (roads, bridges and 
power plants), however not on where which buildings shall be built and where not, as 
if the EU were not aﬀected by these locational issues. Not a single word by the EU 
mentions possible conﬂicts of interest – this raises some questions: Which infrastruc-
ture projects do the Chinese plan? Which infrastructure projects do the Europeans 
plan? Which projects are in both parties’ interest? And most important: where are 
potential conﬂicts of interest?
Meanwhile, the Chinese initiative keeps picking up speed. Headlines such as “Eastern 
Europe worships Beijing – and hopes for billions” (Verseck 2017) or “The Chinese are 
spreading throughout Eastern Europe” (FAZ 2017c) emphasize this. The occasion for 
these headlines was a meeting towards the end of November 2017 by the initiative 16 
plus 1, established in 2012, which regularly brings China together with 16 EU and non-
EU members.11 During the event in Budapest, the Chinese pledged 3 billion dollars to 
the region for infrastructure projects. Among others, one major investment is for the 
new railway line between Budapest and Belgrade to the amount of 2.1 billion dollars. 
Construction is expected to begin in 2020/21 (FAZ 2017c).
All this suggests one point: the EU currently does not have a suﬃciently detailed infra-
structure development concept in this area which could be compared with the Chi-
nese ideas. They are literally being caught wrong-footed. More precisely, the topic of 
the OEM Corridor comes up from time to time, but it undoubtedly is not one of the 
pressing EU projects. In addition, the area outside the EU, covering the six Western 
Balkan (WB 6) countries, is certainly not the focus of the EU policies. Due to increas-
ing political pressure caused by the Chinese initiative it has become apparent that 
there is no detailed overall concept specifying what an expansion towards WB 6 might 
look like, neither by the EU, nor by the countries lying on the OEM Corridor.
10 The main points for the following paragraphs of this section are interpreted from the statements of 
the Belt and Road Summit held on May 14-15, 2017 in Beijing.
11 This group involves countries such as Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the three 
Baltic States as well as Bulgaria and Romania. From the former Yugoslavia, the EU Members Croatia 
and Slovenia participate as well as Serbia, the Republic of Northern Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Albania.
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4.2 The Orient/East-Med Corridor: a ‘life world’ perspective
A broad spectrum of problem areas inﬂuenced by the contextual challenges (political 
and geo-strategic) emerges along the OEM Corridor. Some of these are presented 
brieﬂy.
According to the European Commission, some eastern European countries, including 
Hungary for example, do not respect or support fundamental central constitutional 
values and certain EU policies to the necessary extent. The commission is therefore 
considering linking subsidies to respect for these fundamental values and decisions. 
As a result, some eastern European EU countries will have to fear losing billions of 
euros. This would further weaken the already scarce ﬁnancial resources of these coun-
tries and reduce their scope for investment, for example in the railway network (Beck-
er 2017). The threat posed by the EU and other places of possibly cancelling subsidies 
for countries opposing the EU migration policy only increases the resistance. Howev-
er, due to a strong ﬁnancial inﬂuence of China in Eastern, Central and Southern Europe 
for the ‘New Silk Road’, these countries do not rely on the EU as the only ﬁnancial 
source anymore (Schwarz 2017).
The next problem area is related to the preceding one in a similar fashion. It deals with 
the six countries of the Western Balkan, lying between the state territories of the EU 
Members Croatia and Greece: Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of 
Northern Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania. The chances for these countries of EU 
membership are currently estimated to be quite low. However, autocratically gov-
erned states with historical ties to the Balkans such as Russia and Turkey, but also new 
global players from the Arabian Gulf, see such a brittle relationship between the EU 
and the Western Balkans as a clear opportunity for strengthening their own economic 
and political position in the region; e. g. Turkish investors have already invested more 
than a billion Euro into traﬃc- and energy infrastructure in Kosovo (Mayr/Puhl 2017). 
Therefore, the question remains how these states can be included in a long-term rail-
way concept.
Other problem areas refer to the basic state of some Balkan countries, including espe-
cially: the behavior of the ruling elites, the condition of state administration (e. g. deﬁ-
ciencies in the cadastral or tax administration), and the topic of corruption among 
ruling elites (Schiller 2017). According to the Corruption Perceptions Index 2018 by 
Transparency International, which covers a total of 180 countries worldwide, the most 
corrupt EU countries, in ascending order, are: Italy (rank 53, index 52), Slovakia (rank 
57, index 50), Romania (rank 61, index 47), Greece (rank 67, index 45), and Bulgaria 
(rank 77, index 42) (Transparency International 2018). In this context, it is worth men-
tioning that the anti-corruption report of the EU was abolished in 2017, which for 
many counts as a clear signal of abandoning the ﬁght against crime at the EU level 
(FAZ 2017a).
All these are underlying conditions that do not contribute towards a gain of conﬁ-
dence and therefore do not facilitate the planning and construction of such a railway 
project.
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5 Basic recommendations for the Orient/East-Med Corridor strategy
In conclusion, what is currently missing is a suitable overall strategy which allows the 
allocating of funds. This usually cannot be done at once, but is rather in keeping with 
the timescale of implementing railway infrastructure projects – it usually takes 20, 30 
or sometimes even 40 years to accomplish such comprehensive and complex projects. 
Therefore, the goal of such a strategy should be to develop an integrated overall con-
cept, which addresses the role of railways in oﬀering mobility possibilities to cities and 
regions, keeps an eye on the required subsidy requirements and allows step-by-step 
implementation. The following lines describe the main elements to be taken into ac-
count if we are to prepare a feasible strategy for the OEM Corridor. The structure is 
based on the main components of the ‘problems ﬁrst’ planning approach.
 > Deﬁning the problem: The starting problem is obsolete infrastructure in the 
southern part of the OEM Corridor (i. e. south of Vienna). But, functional infra-
structure is not the main goal per se. Infrastructural improvements necessarily af-
fect positive economic development. In the macro-region scope of the OEM Cor-
ridor, this means mitigating the distinctive divergences between the core and 
periphery regions, thus striving for territorial cohesion.
 > Shifting the problem: Complexity along the OEM Corridor not stems only from 
infrastructural bottlenecks. Rather, it is deeply rooted in a broader political and 
geo-strategic context – diﬀerent histories, identities and cultures, diﬀerent cur-
rent development trends and future perspectives. For centuries, Vienna has been 
the crossroad between the Austro-Hungarian and Orient empires, later between 
the capitalist West and communist East, while today their successors compete 
again for strategic importance in the OEM macro-region. 
 > Assumed relationships: With the previous point on geo-strategic importance in 
mind, the relationships need to be clariﬁed and elaborated. This means taking a 
deeper, two-fold approach. First, globalization makes the world better connected: 
as a result, the European infrastructural network is aﬀected by stakeholders out-
side Europe. In the case of the OEM Corridor, major players come from China, 
Russia, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Secondly, the EU approach is highly 
restrictive (to EU Member States only), which impedes making strategic solu-
tions. Considering the Western Balkan countries as part of the extension of the 
OEM Corridor routes opens the way towards a strategic, long-term and cohesive 
solution.
 > Causes: Naturally, there are some projects aiming to expand the network towards 
WB 6 initiated by countries lying along the OEM Corridor. However, these are 
mostly projects for high-speed passenger rail services. There is often no consider-
ation of how the two rail-bound mode types passenger and cargo transport 
should act together or for which lengths of freight trains the routes are construct-
ed. In addition, there are no concepts on how the main routes will be connected 
to the bordering regions to the east and west, for example by railway lines on 
which an integrated timetable can operate.
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 > Measures: An integrated synchronized timetable poses the following challenge: 
important railway nodes, aside from the main route, have to be connected as fol-
lows. Assume two stops, A and B, lie on the main route and an additional railway 
node C lies between A and B, albeit oﬀset from the main line. C has railway con-
nections to A as well as B. In this situation, it makes sense to strive for a timetable 
connection as shown by the following train trip: an exemplary train, starting at the 
respective cycle time at B, travelling from B to A via C, should arrive at A by its 
scheduled cycle time. Establishing this is not always easy, because – just to name 
an example – measures (e. g. capacity expansions) to reduce travel time may have 
to be implemented on the route B-C-A.
 > Concepts: Chinese investments are dominant along the OEM Corridor nowadays 
(cf. the Greek port of Piraeus and the railway Belgrade-Budapest line), and there 
is a certain ‘ideology’ behind these investments which makes them so successful. 
Namely, a concept by the Chinese (maybe not thoroughly known by the Europe-
ans) is that economic interests may be the main driver. This begs the question: 
which concept do the Europeans have in this area and especially, how can the Chi-
nese projects be made compatible with the European concept?
 > Planning approach: Finally, making comprehensive strategy demands clear coor-
dination. Such a coordinative role can certainly be devoted to planners, as experts 
capable of working in a multidisciplinary and intersectoral environment, and capa-
ble of understanding the problem on various scales – from local to transnational. 
Keeping such complex demands in mind, a variety of approaches appears as a logi-
cal choice enabling a range of diﬀerent solutions. 
These ‘key seven’ are recommended as the pattern for solving complex problems 
along the OEM Corridor, an area with a variety of fuzzy barriers that impede compre-
hensive strategic development. The seven components can also be seen as steps in 
preparing the strategy. Nevertheless, it is important to note that all seven steps in the 
process are often run through several times in an iterative or back and forth fashion. 
In this way, the content of each step in the process is modiﬁed and thereby made to ﬁt 
with that of the others in a lock and key fashion. This ﬁnally secures long-term and 
feasible solutions.
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